The low income gap: a new indicator based on a minimum income standard by Donald Hirsch (1255557) et al.
Vol.:(0123456789)
Social Indicators Research
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-019-02241-6
1 3
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
The Low Income Gap: A New Indicator Based on a Minimum 
Income Standard
Donald Hirsch1  · Matt Padley1 · Juliet Stone1 · Laura Valadez‑Martinez1
Accepted: 9 December 2019 
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
In many high-income countries, governments seek to ensure that households at least have 
sufficient incomes to afford basic essentials such as food and clothing, but also to help citi-
zens reach socially acceptable living standards allowing full participation in society. Their 
success in doing so is commonly monitored in terms of how many citizens are below a 
poverty line set relative to median income, and by how far below it they fall (the ‘poverty 
gap’). Yet the threshold below which this gap starts to be measured is arbitrary, begging 
the question of what level of low income needs addressing. A more ambitious measure, 
presented in this paper, considers the extent to which people fall short of a benchmark 
representing a socially agreed minimum standard. This ‘low income gap’ can be used to 
represent the distance a society has to go to eliminate income that is undesirably low. The 
paper presents the indicator, its meaning and some recent trends in the United Kingdom, 
where the methodology behind the indicator has been pioneered. The results demonstrate 
that this empirically derived benchmark has the potential to be of value in other countries, 
in assessing whether they are making progress in reducing low income.
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1 Introduction
Indicators of poverty and low income are useful for public policy in monitoring how many 
households have income at an undesirably low level. But on what basis should such a level 
be set? Thinkers from Adam Smith (1776) to Peter Townsend (1979) have emphasised that 
meeting one’s needs is about reaching standards considered customary in one’s own soci-
ety. High-income countries1 therefore typically use an income threshold set at a fixed per-
centage of mean or median household income as an indicator of poverty, against which the 
success of public policy in this domain can be judged.
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Yet using a relative-income threshold on its own to monitor poverty and low income 
has important limitations as an indicator of whether governments are achieving their goals. 
Two such limitations have been particularly important in the past decade. One is the fact 
that a ‘relative poverty line’ may not be fixed at a level that sufficiently captures the situa-
tion of those groups struggling to get by whom public policymakers would like to help. The 
second is that progress over time in reducing low income may not be adequately monitored 
by a measure automatically pegged to average incomes—particularly in a period when 
average incomes have sometimes fallen, reducing the relative-poverty threshold regardless 
of whether minimum household needs have also gone down.
This paper introduces a complementary indicator of low income that can help address 
these two limitations. This is based on the Minimum Income Standard (MIS): an income 
threshold for each household type derived from a ‘budget standard’, based on lists of items 
that members of the public say people require to meet their basic material needs and to be 
part of contemporary society.
Specifically, the paper presents a ‘low income gap’ indicator that summarises the extent 
to which members of the population have household income below the MIS thresholds, 
combining incidence of below-MIS income with the average ‘depth’ of the shortfall. This 
indicator complements relative-income indicators in two ways.
First, it takes account of low income among a wider section of the population than con-
ventional relative-income thresholds such as 60% median income (the main poverty thresh-
old used in the European Union). The MIS research shows that a minimum acceptable liv-
ing standard as described by the general public generally requires a higher income than 
these official ‘poverty lines’. This finding corresponds with public debate about helping 
people who have been left behind economically, which is wider than just allowing people 
to escape poverty.
Second, an evidence-based indicator of what is considered a minimum to live in con-
temporary society, regularly updated, avoids the disadvantages of more abstract calcula-
tions, whether deriving from an ‘absolute’ or a ‘relative’ threshold. ‘Absolute’ poverty 
lines, expressed as thresholds fixed over time in real terms, do not take account of changes 
in society. ‘Relative’ thresholds index such changes automatically to median income, 
meaning that in a recession when median income is falling, poverty rates can fall even 
when nobody is getting better off. The MIS-based indicator allows for changes over time in 
the threshold due to changes in norms and living patterns, but only in relation to identified 
changes in the goods and services that households require, rather than being triggered, for 
example, by short-term fluctuations in average incomes.
Such an indicator may not be of much interest if it produced similar results to poverty 
based on a relative-income threshold. However, an important contribution of this paper is 
to demonstrate how it has recently produced substantially different results, using the exam-
ple of the United Kingdom, where MIS data have been developed to inform income distri-
bution comparisons. The purpose of the paper is therefore to demonstrate that the indicator 
described can be useful in identifying trends that inform public policy.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 sets the policy context, in 
terms of a widening concern about low household income, going beyond the context of 
poverty and severe hardship. Section 3 then considers how budget standards measures can 
contribute to low income indicators, set in the context of how poverty relative to contem-
porary standards of living has been conceptualised. Section 4 summarises the method used 
within the MIS research and how the results are used to produce the ‘low income gap’ 
indicator proposed, and ends by explaining the rationale behind the choice of indicator 
and how it should be interpreted. Section 5 then presents results using this indicator, as an 
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illustration of its value in producing policy-relevant indicators of income trends. The paper 
concludes by discussing what these results tell us that is new, and the potential for using 
such an indicator more widely.
2  The Context—A Widening Concern About Low Household Income
The monitoring of progress in addressing low income needs to be set in the context of why 
it is of concern to contemporary societies. The long-term reduction in inequality observed 
in the mid-twentieth century (Kuznets 1955) went into reverse from around the 1980s 
onwards, especially in the United Kingdom and the United States (Hills 1995; Piketty 
2014). This led to particular emphasis on a group with the lowest incomes who had not 
gained from economic growth, and to characterisations initially of an ‘underclass’ (Mead 
1986; Murray 1984) and subsequently to ‘social exclusion’ (Byrne 2005; Levitas 2005). 
Such emphasis on a group (roughly the bottom quintile) being ‘left behind’ informed 
ambitions to reduce relative poverty, such as then UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s (1999) 
pledge to eradicate child poverty in the UK by 2020, using household income below 60% 
of median income as the central indicator. Child poverty has been a particular focus for 
UK policy, because children are more at risk of poverty than any other broad demographic 
group.
More recently, political discourse has emphasised the stagnation of living standards and 
income among a wider group who face insecurity, typically households who have someone 
working but are below median income (Commission on Living Standards 2012). In the UK 
this group have been variously labelled the ‘squeezed middle’ (Parker 2013) or the ‘just 
about managing’ (May 2016), implying a policy concern with helping those with low but 
not necessarily the lowest incomes. This concern reflects a lack of significant growth in 
the real incomes of households at and below the median over the past decade, with no sign 
of a significant improvement (Corlett and Clark 2017). While this phenomenon has been 
evident since at least the start of the 2010s, it was given additional attention with the elec-
tion of Donald Trump in the United States, the vote for Brexit in the UK and the increasing 
strength of some European parties on the extreme right and left, which some commentators 
attribute in part to the disillusion of voters who feel left behind economically, even though 
they may not be in deep poverty (Barber 2017; Elgenius 2017; Inglehart and Norris 2016).
A widening of concern about who is being left behind, to include not just the poor-
est households but also those who are frustrated by their inability to progress to a reason-
able living standard through work (Parker 2013), suggests that progress against an income 
threshold portrayed as a ‘poverty line’ may not tell the whole story. Whelan et al. (2017) 
explore how an alternative multi-dimensional indicator can capture changes in the eco-
nomic fortunes of groups in different ‘income classes’, using a measure of ‘deprivation’, 
based on not being able to afford certain things ranging from a car to keeping one’s home 
warm, and an index of ‘economic stress’ based on debt and reported financial difficulties. 
This analysis identifies recent stresses among income classes not just in poverty (below 
60% median income) but also ‘precarious’ (60–75% of median income) and ‘lower-middle’ 
(75–125% of median income). Whelan et al.’s findings thus demonstrate how income that 
is low but above the poverty line can be associated with certain levels of deprivation and 
economic stress. As set out at the end of Sect. 4 below, this paper presents the rationale for 
monitoring the extent of low income against a threshold that would include most of the 
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‘precarious’ and a few of the ‘lower-middle’ group referred to by Whelan et al., while still 
giving greater weight to those with incomes further down the distribution.
3  Relative Poverty and Budget Standards as Complementary Ways 
of Understanding Low Income
Relative poverty measures have become important in relation to Townsend’s (1979) defi-
nition of people being in poverty if they cannot afford a living standard considered ‘cus-
tomary, or at least widely encouraged or approved in the societies to which they belong’ 
(Townsend 1979, p. 31). A similar concept was first articulated at the European level by 
the European Council in 1975 (Eurostat 2013, p. 2), defining poverty as having resources 
‘so inadequate as to preclude them from having a standard of living considered accept-
able in the society in which they live’. In high-income countries, the number of people 
living below a percentage of average income has become the most common indicator of 
falling behind society’s norms, and the European Union (EU) uses 60% of national median 
income for this purpose. There is wide recognition that income tells only part of the story, 
and multidimensional indicators can be of value (Eurostat 2013; Alkire and Foster 2011; 
Amir-ud-Din et al. 2017), but relative-income poverty remains the main summary measure 
of progress in reducing the incidence of low income in these countries. This indicator is in 
practice most commonly used to calculate incidence of poverty. However, the importance 
of depth of poverty (how far below the threshold, on average, people fall), and hence a 
poverty gap (incidence times depth) are also well recognised in the literature (Sen 1976; 
Shorrocks 1995; Alkire and Foster 2011).
Relative-poverty lines implicitly assume that the threshold of poverty is directly pro-
portional to a country’s mean or median income. Ravallion and Chen (2011), point out 
that such an assumption would be justified if poverty derived purely from the utility of 
relative income itself—the intrinsic benefit and harm derived from keeping up with or fall-
ing behind the norm. Yet they show that relative income cannot be the only determinant of 
minimum needs, or in the poorest countries the poverty line would tend to zero. Further-
more, they show that the utility derived from having access to specific goods and services 
deemed necessary in one’s society, yielding dignity and the ability to participate in custom-
ary social and economic activities, is not purely relativistic. This is closely related to Sen’s 
(1983, 1985) concept of capabilities. Ravallion and Chen suggest that the cost of achieving 
these capabilities does rise as societies get better off, but more slowly than in direct propor-
tion to increases in average national income. Their empirical evidence comparing official 
poverty lines set by developing countries to average income in those countries supports this 
hypothesis—at least to the extent that these lines do reflect minimum costs. Specifically, 
while the poorest countries set something like an ‘absolute’ poverty line, lower-middle and 
upper-middle ones construct income poverty lines that rise in absolute terms, but are lower 
as a percentage of the national average, the higher the average national income. For ‘high 
income’ countries, however, the hypothesis is not testable by comparing official poverty 
lines with average incomes, since these countries’ definition of poverty in relative-income 
terms simply begs the question of whether such direct proportionality is justified.
Budget standards studies, by looking more specifically at how much is required as a 
minimum in particular countries at particular times, can help to ground low income indica-
tors in contemporary social realities. Such studies estimate what different types of house-
hold need based on ‘baskets’ of necessary goods and services constructed by experts, by 
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members of the general public or by a combination of the two (Deeming 2017; Saunders 
and Bedford 2017; Bradshaw et al. 2008; Family Budget Unit 2005). The contribution of 
these studies can be considered in relation to three limitations of relative income measures: 
the potential non-proportionality of minimum relative to average income, as raised above; 
the arbitrariness of setting the level of a poverty line as a percentage of mean or median 
income; and the extent to which minimum requirements are affected by factors other than 
income itself.
The first issue, of whether counting how many households fall below a constant percent-
age of average income is a useful indicator in making comparisons across place or time, 
is relevant both to comparisons between countries with wide differences in income and to 
comparisons over time in countries with changing income levels. Are bodies like the EU 
right to compare the numbers below 60% median in countries of highly variable levels 
of prosperity? Such a measure suggests, for example, that a Swede with below 60% of 
the Swedish median faces relative poverty with implications that are comparable to some-
one below 60% of the median in Greece, where the median income is only a third as high 
(Eurostat 2017). While the cost of maintaining capabilities associated with social participa-
tion is likely to be higher in Sweden than in Greece, because social and economic struc-
tures are influenced by the prevailing income level, it may not be three times as high. The 
Greek case also raises issues over whether such proportionality applies to changes over 
time: the median income in Greece fell by over one-third between 2010 and 2015 (Eurostat 
2017), but this has not necessarily made it one-third cheaper to meet minimum needs in 
the context of Greek society; indeed, by 2013, the poorest fifth of Greek households were 
having to devote two-thirds of their income to food and housing, requiring them to halve 
their expenditure on other essentials like clothing and household goods (Kaplanoglou and 
Rapanos 2016, pp. 14–15.) The cost of achieving capabilities is unlikely to follow rapid 
changes in median incomes, but more likely to be influenced by long-term changes in soci-
ety, whether structural (such as patterns of access to services) or cultural (such as norms 
relating to entertainment, communication, clothing or diet).
Budget standards calculate minimum income requirements with more direct reference 
to contemporary, country-specific, norms as well as scientifically recognised requirements 
such as healthy diets. Consensual methods such as the Minimum Income Standard research 
can directly investigate the extent of continuity and change over time in what is seen as a 
minimum (Davis et al. 2018). Such minimum budgets and the definitions used to produce 
them are culturally specific, making direct comparison of results across countries difficult 
(Valadez and Hirsch 2014), but ensuring that the minimum is appropriate to the country 
where it is applied, and giving scope for tracking the extent of low income against bench-
marks kept up to date according to a consistent definition.
The second issue is whether 60% median or any other relative-income percentage can 
be empirically justified. Conceptually, the notion of having the minimum resources needed 
to participate in society (Townsend 1979; Bradshaw et al. 2008) suggests an income point 
that divides adequate from inadequate resources, rather than just a continuum of economic 
well-being. Townsend suggested that such a threshold could be estimated by observing 
below which income level the incidence of deprivation rises sharply, where deprivation is 
measured as the proportion of households reporting that they are unable to afford certain 
necessities. However, in the 4 decades since this was proposed, there has been no clear-cut 
empirical evidence identifying an income poverty line using this method. Rather, observa-
tions of the relationship between income and deprivation have suggested a more continuous 
escalation of the risk as income falls over a wide range, and indeed the observed increase 
in risk stops rising below a certain level, possibly because of respondents misreporting 
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very low income and other measurement difficulties (Berthoud and Bryan 2011; Hirsch 
et al. 2016; Ferragina et al. 2013).
An alternative threshold produced through a budget standard, representing what people 
require as a minimum in order to function in contemporary society, needs to be carefully 
distinguished from poverty measures in terms of its meaning. Importantly from a policy 
perspective, it may represent a living standard that society considers it to be desirable for 
everyone to move towards, but not necessarily a level below which the risk of specific 
forms of hardship or deprivation start to increase more rapidly. In this context such a stand-
ard can be seen as a politically relevant benchmark but not as a poverty line. Policies may 
seek in the long term to reduce the number of people below such a minimum, but may also 
aim to improve incomes among those who remain below this level, including below some 
lower ‘poverty line’ at which the risk of material hardship is greater.
Whether in relation to a poverty threshold or a minimum income standard, there is a 
strong case for considering not only the incidence of how many people fall below a line 
but also how far short they fall. In the poverty literature, ‘depth’ of poverty has been high-
lighted both for income and deprivation indicators, the latter relating to how many ways in 
which one is deprived (Delamonica and Minujin 2007). In the case of income, the concept 
of a ‘poverty gap’, expressed as a ratio showing the average amount (including zero) by 
which members of the population fall below the poverty line, was pioneered by Sen (1976), 
has generated many variations (Shorrocks 1995, Alkire and Foster 2011, p. 292) and is 
part of the World Bank’s suite of World Development Indicators (World Bank (n.d). More-
over, poverty gap indicators have been shown to be useful in producing results distinct 
from threshold indicators, for example by highlighting a period in the United Kingdom 
(1981–1990) when the overall extent of poverty was worsening even though its incidence 
remained similar (Jenkins and Lambert 1997, p. 326).
To some degree, using such an indicator measuring the aggregate gap below a line 
reduces the importance of where exactly a threshold is set. For example, it reduces the 
impact on the indicator of people going from slightly above to slightly below the threshold, 
or vice versa, relative to changes in the depth of poverty among people well below the line. 
On the other hand, it is important that even a weighted measure of a poverty gap neglects 
part of a wider low income problem by giving a zero weight to those above the poverty 
line. As referred to in the previous section, there has been increasing attention to a large 
group of the population on modest but not very low incomes who may be excluded from 
poverty measures. A ‘low income gap indicator’, comprising a weighted count of those 
falling below an adequate living standard, situated some way above the poverty line, has 
the potential to take account of a wider range of households, whose low income is of public 
concern. Yet in this case, a weighted indicator, that takes account of depth and not just inci-
dence of falling below the line, is particularly significant because of the wide range of situ-
ations of those below the line. A threshold indicator alone might for example show positive 
trends among those on low working incomes even while incomes deteriorated among much 
worse-off groups who were out of work.
The third issue concerns the usefulness of using income thresholds as a guide to social 
policy. In both lower and higher income countries, economic well-being depends on a wide 
range of influences apart from income. As a result, indices of deprivation need to be multi-
dimensional (Bourguignon and Chakravarty 2003). In the context of global poverty, Amir-
ud-Din et al. (2017) define deprivation in terms of nine basic ‘functionings’, and develop 
indicators aimed at measuring each of these. In high-income countries, where issues of 
access to basic amenities such as clean water are less important, the income needed to 
escape deprivation interacts with the availability and cost of services: a household with 
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access to free or subsidised health care, or reasonably priced housing or transport, will 
have very different living standards from a household without these economic advantages 
(Nolan and Whelan 1996). In this context, it still makes sense for policy to have objectives 
with regard to raising incomes to adequate levels, but it needs to do so with an awareness 
of factors that help determine minimum household spending requirements, and potentially 
in combination with policies that help bring down these costs. A budget standard based 
on a priced basket of goods and services can be more sensitive to changes in costs, and to 
structural differences in costs faced by different household types, than a relative income 
threshold. For example, it takes account of the extent of and changes in public subsidies 
that affect private spending requirements on services such as health and transport.
4  Methodology: Using the Minimum Income Standard to Produce 
an Income Gap Indicator
Since 2008, the Minimum Income Standard (MIS) has been calculated regularly in the 
United Kingdom, based on research in which focus groups comprising members of the 
public are tasked with identifying the prerequisites for a minimum living standard.
The details of this method have been described elsewhere (Davis et al. 2017; Valadez-
Martínez et al. 2017; Bradshaw et al. 2008). In summary, the method proceeds as follows. 
Deliberative focus groups are undertaken, tasked with drawing up budget standards for 
each of a range of different household types. Each group comprises members of the gen-
eral public from the household type under discussion, from diverse socio-economic back-
grounds. A ‘task group’ works to agree a detailed lists of goods and services required to 
reach a minimum living standard, working to a common definition. Two subsequent rounds 
of groups confirm or amend these initial lists, and resolve any outstanding disagreements. 
Expert input is used to provide information on matters such as nutritional adequacy, which 
feeds into this process. The results are used to compile a minimum budget for each house-
hold type. In the UK, rounds of groups have been held every 2 years since 2008, typically 
comprising 20–30 groups on each occasion, with budgets ‘rebased’ every 4 years for any 
one household type in order to ensure they remain up to date. The method has been repli-
cated in a similar form in other high-income countries including France (Gilles et al. 2014) 
and Ireland (Collins et al. 2012), and in pilot form in two middle-income countries, Mexico 
(Valadez-Martínez et al. 2017) and South Africa (Byaruhanga et al. 2017).
Previous budget standards studies have had limited potential for providing direct indica-
tors of the incidence of low income, because they have calculated only the budgets of a lim-
ited number of specific household types—such as a family with two children aged exactly 
10 and 4, which most of the population would not precisely match (e.g. Family Budget 
Unit 2005; Saunders and Bedford 2017). They have also made occasional rather than regu-
lar calculations. The UK MIS research, in contrast, is regularly repeated, providing annual 
updates at least with inflation. It applies to a wide range of household types and allows esti-
mation of thresholds for all types of household. This allows systematic comparison with 
the actual distribution of household incomes that has not previously been possible.
The ability to use MIS to derive benchmarks for all UK household types, rather than 
just selected examples, derives in the first instance from a ‘modular’ structure to the cal-
culations—using rules about the effects of including different types of household member 
rather than just making a calculation for an example household as a whole. This involves 
assigning individual spending needs to family members, including children in different age 
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bands, and others to families as a whole according to size, incorporating assumptions about 
economies of scale. This directly produces benchmark income requirements for 80% of the 
UK population, comprising 107 household types (varying mainly with number and age of 
children). In order to produce a full estimate of the low-income profile of the population, 
a further set of assumptions are made (Hirsch et al. 2016, pp. 46–52). For example, cur-
rently there is no direct research on the needs of couples with more than four children, but 
a budget for a larger household can be estimated by assuming that each additional child 
costs the same as the additional cost of the fourth child. An estimate of the costs of addi-
tional non-dependent adults, also not directly covered by MIS, requires further assump-
tions. Non-related adults are assumed to have the same costs as if they were in separate 
households, minus a small saving due to economies identified in a separate study on the 
needs of single working-age people sharing accommodation, such as requiring only one 
set of living room furniture, and achieving economies of scale on heating bills (Hill et al. 
2015). For adult household members who are related to each other, greater economies due 
to intra-household sharing are assumed, informed by separate research on family sharing 
(Hill and Hirsch 2019). While the analysis involves assigning ‘estimated’ weights to house-
hold members in some atypical households, these are far less crude than the system used 
for equivalisation of poverty data, which gives equal weight to every additional household 
member aged over 14, whether a schoolchild, a young adult living with their parents, an 
additional single person in a shared house or a spouse of either working or pension age 
(Department for Work and Pensions 2016).
A further step required in monitoring the number of people falling below benchmarks 
based on MIS arises from the need to consider income changes annually, based on research 
that takes place less frequently. Each budget is ‘rebased’ (recalculated using fresh research) 
every 4 years. This regular updating is already an improvement on previous budget stand-
ards research based on studies funded as ‘one off’ exercises. Saunders and Bedford (2017, 
p. 126) note for example that in their original work in the late 1990s they advocated 5-year 
updates, but that instead, nearly 2 decades had elapsed before repeating the work, and that 
comparisons over time were further limited by changes in the family types used. Yet even 
4-yearly, consistent updates in MIS do not fully resolve the ‘misalignment’ of changes 
in the benchmark and in the actual incomes to which it is being compared annually. For 
example, were there to be a period of rising general living standards, in which every house-
hold’s income rose 1% a year in real terms, and were the concept of a minimum to rise 
exactly in line with general living standards, one might expect a smooth increase in the 
minimum benchmark by 1% a year, with no change in the numbers who fell below it. How-
ever, if baskets were only revalued every 4 years, but income shown to be rising annually, 
household incomes would appear to rise relative to the minimum in the years between the 
revaluations, and fall back when the benchmark jumped every 4 years. Such discontinuities 
could be a significant disadvantage of a budget standards benchmark rather than a rela-
tive-income benchmark, which changes continuously. In order to address this, each year’s 
budget in this analysis is represented as an inflation-adjusted average of calculated budgets 
over 4 years. (Each budget represents cost at a point of time, but incomes are surveyed over 
the course of a year. The four budgets that are averaged therefore measure costs (a) a year 
before the start of the survey year, (b) at the start of the survey year, (c) at the end of the 
survey year and (d) a year after the end of the survey year.) In other words, the effect of 
any real-terms change resulting from the quadrennial recalculation of baskets is introduced 
gradually, by using a rolling 4-year average.
Using these MIS-derived benchmarks for the whole UK population, regular compari-
sons are made between actual income net of taxes, housing and childcare costs, and the 
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minimum required by households (Stone et al. 2018). The income data derives from the 
Family Resources Survey (FRS), the UK’s principal, publicly funded annual household 
income survey with an annual sample of around 20,000. It is worth noting that secondary 
analysis confirms a strong relationship between income measured relative to MIS and the 
risk of deprivation. Hirsch et al. (2016) indicated that the risk of deprivation, defined as 
being unable to afford key items considered by the population as essential, increases con-
tinuously as households fall further short of MIS, with those below around three quarters 
of the MIS level having a four times greater chance of deprivation than households with 
incomes above MIS. Moreover, analysis undertaken by the Scottish Fuel Poverty Defini-
tion Review Panel within the UK (2017, p. 128) found that income relative to MIS is a 
more accurate predictor of a range of adverse outcomes than income relative to the median. 
Qualitative evidence also suggests that having an income below the MIS level has socially 
undesirable consequences. A study of families with children that have incomes at least 10% 
below the MIS level (Hill et al. 2016) found that while some just about coped, most led 
constrained lives, and those falling at least 25% below MIS were increasingly at risk of 
hardship and debt unless they had support from extended family.
4.1  The Low Income Gap Indicator
Using the above method of comparing actual household income to the MIS benchmarks, 
this paper proposes a ‘low income gap’ indicator. Like the ‘poverty gap’ indicators dis-
cussed above, this is defined as the percentage of the population in households below the 
income threshold times the average amount (in percentage terms) that they fall below it. 
The indicator is proposed as a means of aggregating the progress of policy in tackling low 
income overall, covering everyone living below what members of the public think you 
need for an adequate standard of living, and not just below a poverty line. Importantly, 
it adopts not the dichotomous approach of simply counting the incidence of households 
below a line, but is weighted by how far households fall below this threshold. This feature 
is particularly important when using a threshold below which people are at risk of being 
‘left behind’, but who may not necessarily be in serious hardship or poverty. Simply track-
ing the incidence of incomes below this line without measuring depth could present as an 
improvement a situation where people on modest incomes went from just below to just 
above the threshold, even while those with much lower incomes, with a high resulting risk 
of material hardship, became worse off.
5  Results
Overall, the comparison of UK household incomes relative to the MIS threshold shows that 
29% of the population were living below MIS in 2016/17, compared to the official estimate 
of 22% individuals below 60% of median income, after housing costs (Department for 
Work and Pensions 2018). The difference is due to the MIS level being above the conven-
tional poverty line for most household types, typically around 70–85% of median income 
after housing costs (Davis et al. 2018). An indicator showing trends in the low income gap 
relative to MIS therefore captures what is happening to the incomes of a wider section of 
the population than conventional poverty indicators—including those in ‘precarious’ and in 
some cases ‘lower-middle’ income classes according to Whelan et al. (2017) classification.
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The key trends since 2008/09 to 2016/17 are shown in Fig. 1. This graph shows that the 
direction and magnitude of trends in low income are sensitive to which indicator is used.
Between 2008/09 and 2011/12, in the wake of the global financial crisis, the percentage 
of individuals in households below MIS rose sharply, while the percentage in households 
below 60% median income fell modestly. This difference can be explained simply by the 
fact that during this period, median incomes fell in real terms (relative to the Consumer 
Prices Index, CPI), while the Minimum Income Standard rose relative to CPI. A large part 
of the increase in MIS was due to faster than average inflation rates for some essentials, 
causing the inflation rate for an essential basket of goods and services to be higher than 
for CPI (Davis et al. 2016, p. 39). Moreover, the content of MIS baskets remained largely 
stable during this period (although private transport costs rose due to changing percep-
tions about the availability and adequacy of public transport), implying that the fall in a 
relative-income poverty line during a period of economic recession was not reflected in any 
reduced perception of what is required to meet minimum needs. Conversely, after 2014, 
these trends went into reverse. During this period, MIS budgets were stable in real terms, 
while incomes rose slightly faster than inflation, causing the numbers below MIS to fall.
However, the relative poverty rate increased, implying that the number of people 
brought below the poverty line because their incomes rose more slowly than the median 
exceeded those raised above the line because their incomes rose faster than the median.
Figure 1 also plots the low-income and poverty gap indicators over time, which show 
the aggregate ‘gap’ between actual income and the threshold falling relative to incidence, 
implying that average depth below these thresholds fell. Over the period as a whole, this 
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phenomenon has been particularly marked in the case of the MIS/low income indicators. 
Over the period as a whole, more people have fallen below MIS, but the overall low income 
gap has not grown. This can be explained by the fact that to a large degree, the deteriora-
tion in incomes has been seen among people in work, who do not have very low incomes 
(Stone et al. 2018). Those on out of work benefits were initially protected by index-linking 
of benefits, and a subsequent freeze in their level, as well as other benefit cuts introduced 
from 2016 onward, was not yet being felt at the time of reporting. This makes the level of 
the income gap of considerable interest for future observation.
Figure  2 helps interpretation of these results further in relation to the change in the 
income distribution between the start and end of this period. The bars show percentiles of 
the distribution relative to MIS and median income for 2016/17, and the lines for 2008/09, 
in each case centred on the relevant income threshold (100% of MIS or 60% of median). 
Across most of the lower part of the distribution, each bar is close to its equivalent line, 
showing little change since 2008. However, for the MIS comparisons, there is a gap close 
to and above the MIS level that indicates smaller percentages of the population reaching, 
for example, 90%, 100% or 110% of MIS in the later than the earlier year. (This is offset by 
somewhat more reaching given percentages of the MIS level at the bottom of the distribu-
tion.) Overall, these results show significant changes in income for people just above or just 
below the MIS line. On the one hand, this indicates that changes in incidence somewhat 
over-emphasise the rise and fall in number below MIS during this period, insofar as it is 
driven by people falling only slightly below MIS. On the other hand, it shows that there is 
a large group of people close to this line who may be ‘just about managing’ and find it hard 
to manage if their situation deteriorates—people not identified if one looks at the poverty 
line alone.
The low income gap can also be used as an indicator to compare the extent of low 
income across groups, and how this is changing over time. The following comparisons 
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divide the population into three groups based on age: pensioners (people over the state 
pension age), children (people aged under 16 or under 19 and still in full-time secondary 
education) and working age (everybody else). Note that these broad categories, used com-
monly in UK income data, cover all individuals by age based on the income of the house-
holds they live in. They thus to some extent overlap in terms of the households they cover: 
the household income of a family with children affects both adults and children within that 
household.
Figure 3 illustrates a comparison between two of these groups, using as an example a 
particularly striking comparison: working age adults and pensioners. The incidence of low 
income is nearly twice (1.9 times) as great for the former than the latter. In addition, the 
average shortfall for pensioners who do fall short is somewhat smaller than for those of 
working age. As a consequence, the difference between the groups is even greater when 
considering the overall income gap than the incidence of low income: for working age 
adults, the income gap is over double (2.2 times) the pensioner level.
Table 1 considers how the low income gap for different age groups has changed over 
time. It shows that even though, for the population as a whole, a rise in incidence has been 
fully offset by a fall in depth (as reflected in Fig. 1 above), this does not hold for all groups. 
Working age adults, who comprise 60% of the population, saw a substantial decrease in 
depth and only a modest increase in incidence, causing the low income gap to fall. For 
children, and pensioners, in contrast, a greater increase in the incidence of low income was 
offset by only small falls in depth, causing the low income gap to rise.
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Figure 4 illustrates very different patterns of income distribution, relative to MIS, across 
different groups. As seen in Table 1 above, not only are there fewer pensioners than aver-
age on low incomes but the average shortfall is more modest than for other groups. Fig-
ure 4 shows few pensioners on very low incomes, with those on the fifth percentile being 
about a third below MIS, compared to around two-thirds below for the fifth percentile of 
working age adults and children. On the other hand, while children are far more likely to be 
below MIS than working age adults, they have a similar chance of having very low income, 
below about half of MIS, and a relatively high proportion of children below MIS do not fall 
a long way below the line. Consequently, the average shortfall is highest among working 
age adults below MIS, reflecting the fact that within the UK adults without children get 
weaker social protection than families: UK safety-net benefits are lower as a proportion of 
MIS for the former than the latter (Padley and Hirsch 2017, p. 9; Stone et al. 2018).
In the case of housing tenure (Fig. 5), whereas social tenants are by far the most likely 
to have incomes below MIS compared to other groups (reflecting the targeting of eligibility 
for social housing in the UK on economically disadvantaged groups), the average shortfall 
is lower than for private tenants below MIS. Figure 5 shows that a as many private as social 
tenants have very low incomes, below half of MIS. This reflects the fact that income here is 
measured after housing costs; people on low incomes who face high rents as a result of liv-
ing in private accommodation are particularly vulnerable to having low disposable incomes. 
These larger shortfalls mean that the greater extent to which social compared to private tenants 
experience low income is not as great when considering the low income gap as it is for the 
incidence of low income. Conversely, home owners are not only less likely to be below MIS, 
but when they are, their shortfall is on average smaller. This combines to produce an overall 
low income gap only about a fifth as much for home owners compared to tenants.
Table 1  Low income gap over time, for different population groups
Per cent of population below 
MIS (incidence) [%]
Average per cent that they are 
below MIS (depth) [%]
Low income gap (inci-
dence times depth) [%]
All population
2008/09 27.2 30.9 8.4
2016/17 29.0 28.8 8.4
Children
2008/09 39.6 28.7 11.4
2016/17 42.5 28.1 12.0
Working age
2008/09 27.4 33.0 9.0
2016/17 28.7 30.2 8.7
Pension age
2008/09 12.3 25.1 3.1
2016/17 16.0 24.4 3.9
 D. Hirsch et al.
1 3
6  Interpretation of Results for the UK
The analysis in the previous section, focused on the UK, sheds light on the developing profile 
of low income there in ways that can be of interest to policy makers. It shows that the num-
ber of households with incomes below a minimum standard has risen over the past decade. 
For working age adults, but far less so for children and pensioners, this has been associated 
with more people being just below the MIS line, and hence a reduction in the average ‘depth’ 
of low income. For children, the group with the highest risk of low income, this indicator is 
particularly useful in assessing the ongoing effects of a major shift in policy. Up to 2010, the 
most explicit objective in relation to low income was to reduce child poverty, and one conse-
quence of this was that in the period immediately following the 2008 financial crash, benefits 
and tax credits supporting those on the lowest incomes were being protected, at a time when 
income from work was falling in real terms. However, from 2015, the UK government has 
been putting increasing emphasis on improving the earnings of people on low pay, and less on 
state transfers—a policy that will help selected households with the lowest hourly pay and the 
most working hours. However, such an approach greatly disadvantages those who are work-
poor (i.e. households with nobody working or with few combined working hours relative to 
the number of adults in the household), by freezing, and in some cases cutting, benefit and 
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tax credit entitlements (Hirsch 2017; Grover 2016). The risk here is that this could help bring 
some households across the low income line, but at the same time greatly increase depth of 
low income among work-poor groups. The low income indicator will help track the aggregate 
effect of such policies.
The UK results presented in Figs. 4 and 5 also help identify which sub-groups of the popu-
lation most need help to improve modest incomes, and on the other hand where the risk of 
very low income is greatest. Children and people living in social housing have a very high 
incidence of income below the MIS line, but working age adults and especially private tenants 
have a relatively high risk of being on such low income that they can afford less than half of 
what they need. This reflects the fact that adults without children in the UK on low incomes 
are particularly likely to be in expensive privately rented accommodation, and have had less 
adequate support from the benefits and tax credits system than families with children (Padley 
and Hirsch 2017, p. 9).
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Fig. 5  How far income falls short of MIS, by income percentile in 2016/17: breakdown by housing tenure. 
Source: Author calculations from Family Resources Survey and MIS database. Reported incomes for bot-
tom four percentiles considered unreliable (Hirsch et al. 2016)
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7  Conclusion
This paper has proposed a new ‘low income gap’ indicator, and demonstrated its contribution 
in summarising the overall progress that a country is making to reduce low income. It has 
used the example of the United Kingdom to show that it produces information that usefully 
complements indicators of relative poverty.
The indicator uses a benchmark derived from regularly updated research into what mem-
bers of the public see as a social minimum living standard. Like relative poverty thresholds, 
this changes with contemporary norms, but rather than fluctuating automatically with median 
income, changes are linked to tangible changes in society, as established by consultation with 
members of the public. Another important difference is that research on a minimum budget 
shows that 60% of median income is too little to afford all the things that members of the pub-
lic consider are required to meet material needs and participate in society. This corresponds 
with growing public interest in the fortunes of those on incomes above the poverty line but on 
still-modest incomes. The higher threshold gives a basis for taking those households’ incomes 
into account when tracking the impact of public policy on relieving low income. At the same 
time, by taking account of average depth below this benchmark, it avoids labelling as suc-
cessful policies that help selected groups to cross the line if other much poorer groups face a 
widening income shortfall.
The UK case presented here has illustrated how this indicator can be relevant for policy 
debates. One way is to show the overall trend in low income, which has moved in different 
directions from relative poverty over short time periods as fluctuations in median income 
affect the relative poverty line.
It is also clear from this analysis of the UK that the distribution of income below a low 
income threshold differs in significant ways across groups and across time. For example, 
in some cases low income is comparatively more concentrated among those with modest 
incomes just below the threshold, whereas in others, the problem of very low income is more 
acute. Such differences help identify where policy efforts are most needed, with respect to 
different groups: low income is more ‘broad and shallow’ for children and more ‘narrow and 
deep’ for working age adults, suggesting policies that are more generalised for the former and 
more targeted for the latter. This finding could not have been derived in the same way from a 
standard relative poverty indicator, which does not take account of the large number of chil-
dren who live in families above the poverty line but below the minimum income threshold.
The calculations for the UK made in this paper thus illustrate how the proposed indicator 
can capture more information about the income distribution than simply counting how many 
people fall below a poverty line. Building on the application of the MIS methodology in other 
countries, this low income gap indicator could potentially be applied elsewhere. It is therefore 
a helpful addition to the indicators currently used to assess the adequacy of a country’s house-
hold incomes, and the success of policy in improving them.
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